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INTRODUCTION

The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 19881 has inscribed
the protection of intellectual property rights as one of the principal priorities of United States trade policy. The mandate to negotiate improved
protection in other countries is supported by the statutory authority of
* Partner, Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer and Wood, Washington, D.C. J.D.,
1974, University of Michigan School of Law and the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales; M.A., 1970, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; B.A., 1969, Fordham
University; C.E.P., 1968, Institut D'Etudes Politique, Paris, France.
1. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5403)
[hereinafter 1988 Trade Act]. Section 1101(b)(10) of the 1988 Trade Act sets forth
United States negotiating objectives regarding intellectual property, while section 1303
outlines procedures for identification of countries that deny adequate protection of, or
market access for, intellectual property rights.
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section 301 2 which permits the government to use trade measures as
leverage to achieve certain minimum standards of protection world-wide.
This congressional directive calling for a coordinated approach toward
trade and intellectual property did not, however, set a new policy course;
rather, it confirmed a direction that United States policy had taken for a
number of years. Indeed, the extent to which common approaches and
principles have come to influence international trade and intellectual
property rights policies in recent years invites the question whether we
are witnessing a merger of these previously separate policy pursuits.
The recognition that intellectual property should be part of a broader
set of issues is less dramatic when one considers the approaches of other
countries. For most developing and many developed countries, intellectual property is seen less as a body of fundamental rights than as a subset of their general economic policies, to be managed for their contribution to economic growth and industrial development.' This utilitarian

2. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the 1988 Trade Act, provides that if United States rights or benefits under a trade agreement are violated or an
action, policy, or practice of a foreign country is found to unjustifiably burden or restrict
United States commerce, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) may
(A) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of trade agreement
concessions ... ; (B) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods,...
and fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country .. .; or (C) enter
into binding agreements with such foreign country . . . [to] (i) eliminate . . . the
[unfair] act, policy, or practice . . . [or] (iii) provide the United States with compensatory trade benefits.
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301 (relating to actions by the President), as
amended by the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 1, § 1301(a) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2411). The 1988 Trade Act's amendments to section 302 of the Trade Act of 1974 provide special expedited procedures for investigations under section 301 that involve countries identified as denying adequate and effective protection of, or market access for, intellectual property. See Trade Act of 1974, § 182 (relating to identification of countries
that deny adequate and effective intellectual property protection), as added by 1988
Trade Act, supra note 1, at § 1303(b), 102 Stat. 1179 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2242); § 302(b)(2) (relating to initiation of investigations with respect to acts, policies, or
practices of priority countries identified under section 182(a)(2)), as amended by 1988
Trade Act, supra note 1, § 1301(a), 102 Stat. 1169 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2412
and § 304(3) (relating to time limits for investigations initiated under section 302(b)(2)),
as amended by 1988 Trade Act, supra note 1, at § 1301(a), 102 Stat. 1171 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2414).
3. A publication by the Latin American Association of Pharmaceutical Industries
reflects this view:
Patents, with the monopoly they provide for imports, would eliminate the local
production of raw materials which has arisen in various countries of the region,
worsening the balance of trade by several billion dollars, and therefore, would
reserve the markets of the region for exports from the United States and other
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attitude reflects in part different cultural and philosophical traditions
and explains some of the resistance to United States efforts to secure
improved intellectual property protection abroad.
This Article examines the interaction between trade and intellectual
property rights policies through certain key developments in United
States law, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)4 and
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).5 While this brief

review is not intended to provide a definitive analysis, it will offer worthwhile insights into the prospects for, and implications of, such a merger.
For this purpose, this Article considers the efforts in GATT to negotiate
a code on intellectual property rights and the parallel efforts in WIPO to
negotiate a treaty for the protection of semiconductor designs. While the
GATT talks moved through their midterm review in April 1989,6
WIPO was scheduled to hold a diplomatic conference to conclude a
semiconductor treaty in May.7 This Article focuses on the extent to

developed nations at prices higher than international price levels.
2 (R.
M. Gadbaw & T. Richards eds. 1988) [hereinafter GLOBAL CONSENSUS] (citing Industria FarmaceuticaLatino-Americana: Patentes: la Rambonomio en Accion, year 5, no.
9, 29 (June 1986) (Translation)).
4. 61 Stat. A3, 1366, T.I.A.S. 1700, 51-61 U.N.T.S. The GATT is both an international set of rules governing trade and an institution that administers those rules and
oversees multilateral trade negotiations. It was originally designed as a temporary agreement to protect the value of tariff concessions negotiated after World War II until the
International Trade Organization (ITO) (envisioned as a third major international economic policy organization that would function alongside the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) came into existence. The ITO charter, however, was never
ratified, and the GATT institution essentially took its place. For a detailed discussion of
the history of the GATT, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT
(1969); and R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
(1975).
5. WIPO was organized in 1963 to oversee several of the major international agreements on intellectual property rights protection (including the Berne and Paris Conventions). One of WIPO's missions is to promote the protection of intellectual property
rights through technical assistance and educational support. Convention Establishing the
World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No.
6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
6. The Trade Negotiations Committee held a meeting at the level of high officials in
the first week of April 1989. One of the topics discussed at this meeting was the traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights. Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at
Ministerial Level Montreal, December 9, 1988. GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/7 (MIN)
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?

(1988).
7. Report on the Diplomatic Conferencefor the Conclusion of a Treaty on the Protection of Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits to be Held in Washington, D.C., May 8-26, 1989, WIPO Doc. IPIC/DC/4 (1989). To review the latest draft

226

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 22:223

which trade policy concepts have come to invade the intellectual property
rights arena and, similarly, the penetration of intellectual property rights
into the fabric of international trade law and policy. In the process, the
Article discusses some of the central dilemmas facing United States policy: can the GATT accommodate the notion that implicit in the balance
of GATT concessions is the requirement that GATT members respect
minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property? Is reciprocity a workable principle for the enforcement of intellectual property
rights? Finally, can WIPO be receptive to an enhanced system of enforcement and dispute settlement as a means of instilling greater discipline and rigor into its system of rules?
In an effort to gain further insight into some of these issues, this Article also examines the operation of the Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984 (SCPA),8 a sui generis United States law whose reciprocity
provisions have spurred a number of countries to enact similar laws to
protect chip designs.

II.

THE TRADE PARADIGM

The integration of intellectual property and international trade policy
has spawned a consensus in industry and government around certain basic principles:
(1) trade and intellectual property rights are part of a common set of
policies that must be integrated in the interest of maintaining United
States competitiveness;
(2) the United States should insist on the application and enforcement
of certain minimum standards of intellectual property protection in all
countries in which the United States is commercially engaged;
(3) trade and other commercial concessions that the United States
grants other countries should be conditioned upon adherence to these
standards; and
(4) international agreements should embody these minimum standards
and ensure that they are enforceable as a matter of both domestic and
international law.
Until relatively recently, intellectual property and international trade
policies were relegated to distinct and separate spheres. Each was based
upon its own set of domestic laws and international agreements, alof the treaty, see Diplomatic Conferencefor the Conclusion of a Treaty on the Protection
of Intellectual Property in Respect to Integrated Circuits, WIPO Doc. IPIC/DC/3
(1989).
8. Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14) (Supp. IV
1987).
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though common principles such as national treatment were central features of the international agreements in both domains.9 Entirely distinct
bureaucracies administered these laws and agreements both at the national and international levels, and their efforts were rarely viewed as
requiring coordination, except perhaps in light of foreign political-as
distinct from economic-policy considerations.
More than any other factor, the concerns of the private sector seem to
have been instrumental in changing this perspective. United States companies with substantial investments in foreign countries have contended
with the question of protecting their intellectual property under the legal
regimes of their host governments for many years. Most companies
viewed this situation as a local problem that could be addressed by negotiating an acceptable arrangement with a host government from the outset. The United States Government was perhaps part of this strategy,
but only in subtle and low-key ways.
In the course of the 1970s, however, United States companies apparently began to rethink this approach in light of certain technological,
political, and economic developments in the countries in which they operated. 1" Technological changes in some cases made it much easier to
copy products. With economic development came the desire to promote
entirely indigenous industries. Coupled with higher standards of living
(which created a greater local demand for consumer products), certain
countries became centers of piracy. In some countries, political forces
were able to roll back the level of protection provided. In India, for example, a change in the patent law withdrew protection for pharmaceutical products.1" In some cases, local nationals who had previously worked
for foreign companies played key roles in promoting, the development of
indigenous industries whose business model was build around copying

9.

For a review of the principles in various trade and intellectual property agree-

ments, see H.

STALSON, PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND U.S.

(1987).
10. Among the major developments which caused United States companies to reconsider their previous approach were: (1) the increased role of intellectual property-based
products in international trade; (2) the creation of a global marketplace through improved international communication; (3) the facilitation of piracy of many forms of intellectual property as a result of the development of inexpensive technologies (e.g., for the
reproduction of audio and video tapes and of radio and television broadcasts); (4) the
increased level of research and development (R&D) required in certain industries to
develop new products; and (5) the fact that some new technologies do not fit cleanly
within any of the existing types of intellectual property protection. GLOBAL CONSENSUS,
supra note 3, at 3-5.
11. Id. at 192.
COMPETITIVENESS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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and piracy of intellectual property rights of their former employers.' 2
As these developments began to overwhelm the ability of United States
companies to cope using their traditional approach of working through
local operations, the option of involving the United States Government in
a more activist role became more attractive. The issue was not simply an
erosion in protection of intellectual property rights, but the range of investment-related restrictions that countries seemed increasingly inclined
to impose.' 3 Meanwhile, the United States Government began to
reevaluate its policy of benign neglect toward United States investment
abroad, and attention turned to the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) as the agency most receptive to industry concerns and in the
best position to coordinate efforts by the United States Government to
develop responses. By 1979, USTR had authority to address investment
issues both through the negotiation of agreements and the use of trade
measures to respond to certain forms of investment restrictions. 4
These developments were significant because the private sector began
to look to trade policy as a tool to deal with a range of issues beyond the
traditional scope of trade negotiations-issues that relate to the entire
environment that United States companies confront in other countries.
The private sector was attracted to the network of procedures, advisory
mechanisms, and political relationships which gave industry a greater
feeling that its concerns were understood and that the strategy it worked
out with the United States Government would be implemented in a
forthright, assertive manner, with greater insulation from foreign policyinspired interference than had characterized the resolution of such issues
in the past.
Companies ultimately saw the possibility that the United States Government would be willing to use the leverage inherent in access to the
United States market as a means of stimulating countries to upgrade
their level of protection. Not coincidentally, some of the countries that
posed the most serious problems were heavily dependent upon trade with
the United States. 5

12. Id. at 186.
13. For examples of such restrictions, see Performance Requirements, A Study of
The Incidence and Impact of Trade-RelatedPerformanceRequirements, and an Analysis of InternationalLaw, Labor-Industry Coalition for International Trade (LICIT)
(March 1981). See also Fontheim & Gadbaw, Trade-Related Performance Requirements Under the GATT-MTN System and U.S. Law, 14 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 129
(1982).
14. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 1(b)(1), (2), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979)
(effective Jan. 2, 1980).
15. See GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 3, at 10-26.
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The Trade Act of 198416 provided a Congressional mandate to carry
out this new policy direction concerning the protection of intellectual
property rights. The law required the President to take into account the
protection a foreign nation affords to intellectual property rights when
determining (1) the nation's eligibility for the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP)1" program and (2) whether the actions of the nation
should be considered "unjustifiable" or "unreasonable" for purposes of
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.18 Similarly, the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act19 offered special tariff treatment to nations of
the Caribbean Basin, provided that the President takes into account the
adequacy of intellectual property protection provided by a nation in determining its eligibility for this special treatment.20 What followed was a
rather striking series of successes for this policy of linking trade and intellectual property rights. In a succession of bilateral initiatives, the Administration secured major changes in the intellectual property rights regimes of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. These comprehensive changes
covered patents, copyrights, and trademarks and addressed the entire
range of concerns that had plagued United States companies.2 1
While these early successes seemed to confirm the effectiveness of this

16.

Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948.

17. Id. § 503(c)(5), 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (c)(5) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The GSP
program provides for special tariff preferences for imports from designated developing
nations. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65. The legislative history of the provision linking intellectual property protection to receipt of GSP benefits indicates a congressional intent that
the President consider the following factors, in determining whether a country is providing "adequate and effective means" for foreign nations to secure and enforce intellectual
property rights: the extent of statutory protection for intellectual property (including the
scope and duration of such protection); the remedies available to aggrieved parties; the
willingness and ability of the government to enforce intellectual property rights on behalf
of foreign nationals; the ability of foreign nationals to enforce their intellectual property
rights on their own behalf; and whether the country's system of law imposes formalities
or similar requirements that, in practice, are an obstacle to the meaningful protection for
foreign nationals not imposed on domestic concerns. H.R. REP. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5112-13.

18. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304(f)(2), 98 Stat. 3005, §
301(e) of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e), see supra
note 2. Section 301 provides the President with the authority to seek the elimination of a
foreign nation's unjustifiable or unreasonable trade practices (where such practices burden United States commerce) and authorizes the restriction of imports from that nation if
such practices are not eliminated. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-16 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
19. Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (Supp. V 1987)).
20. Id. § 212(c)(9), 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(9).
21. For a detailed analysis of these changes, see GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 3,
at 272-377.
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strategy, its limitations become evident when balanced against its failures
in other areas. Trade leverage has proved most effective in stimulating
reforms in countries that are especially dependent upon trade with the
United States. 22 When such countries' access to the markets of Europe
and Japan is included, the case for accommodating concerns about intellectual property rights is two to four times as compelling.23 A tradeleveraged strategy is likely to be less effective in countries that are less
dependent on exports to the Western industrialized nations, or in which
other considerations outweigh the trade implications of failure to address
United States concerns.24
The United States strategy of conditioning trade concessions on provision of intellectual property protection inevitably had to confront the issue of its compatibility with the framework of rules and negotiating procedures in GATT. The effectiveness of trade leverage is in fact quite
limited if its use cannot somehow be justified under the GATT rules.
The use of measures whose GATT-consistency is questioned provokes
accusations of unilateralism and raises the threat that other countries
will feel justified in responding in kind. The problem, however, is that
GATT contains only limited references to intellectual property
rights-reflecting the relative non-importance of intellectual property
rights as an international issue in 1974.25
This somewhat static perspective on GATT rules argues strongly for
a new agreement that binds GATT members to a higher standard of
obligation with respect to intellectual property rights than is presently
mandated in any international agreement. This approach is problematic,
however, because it puts the issue entirely into a negotiating context; that
is, to obtain concessions on standards from other GATT members, the
United States and others would be expected to offer something in return.
Like-minded countries will likely be willing to accept the minimum standards that the United States seeks in return for a commitment that the
United States will forego recourse to unilateral responsive measures
(other than those contemplated by the agreement). But for countries unwilling to embrace the standards, there are only two alternatives in this
paradigm: (1) persuade the United States and other countries to agree to
compromise on the standard of protection; or (2) provide concessions in
other areas. The first of these alternatives is unacceptable to the United
States business community and the second is highly problematic.

22. Id. at 21-26.
23. Id. at 24-25.
24. Id. at 26.
25. See id. at 43.
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The quest for an escape from this predicament has attracted some very
thoughtful and creative ideas. One of the most attractive of these is the
notion that it is unnecessary to concede on the basic standards of protection because it would be better to make an agreement solely among likeminded countries, rather than attempting to obtain the participation of
countries that would be unwilling at this point to subscribe to those standards. Among those countries, procedures would then be designed to facilitate trade on the basis that one signatory need not have to worry
about compliance with intellectual property rights standards when goods
cross borders from another signatory state. Ideally, these trade facilitation measures later would be sufficiently appealing to attract other countries as signatories even at the price of upgrading their standards in ways
they might otherwise resist.
This approach presents a problem because non-parties to this agreement could argue that it violates any number of other GATT rules
designed to ensure that countries do not use border measures or procedures for purposes other than those explicitly contemplated by GATT.
In short, if protection of intellectual property rights cannot be considered
part of the bundle of original GATT obligations, even the best-intentioned group of GATT members will be hard-pressed to impose it on
unwilling countries. The United States seems ready to face this issue
squarely in its confrontation with Brazil over pharmaceutical products:
the United States has decided to retaliate against Brazilian piracy by
withdrawing certain trade concessions. Brazil has responded by seeking a
GATT panel determination as to whether such measures are authorized
under GATT.2 ' This case raises the issue of whether the United States
has a GATT defense to its actions even without a new GATT code on
intellectual property.
The only possible United States defense appears in article XXIII of
GATT, which permits a contracting party to claim a nullification or
impairment of GATT rights as a result of either a violation of the
GATT or any other measure that has the effect of denying the party
rights for which it has bargained.27 Although a case can be made that
failure to protect intellectual property rights amounts to such a nullification or impairment, there is virtually no chance that a GATT panel
would accept the defense in the Brazilian case.

26. See United States Isolated As It Resists Callfor Probe of Tariffs on Brazilian
Goods, [Jan.-June] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 23 (Jan. 4, 1989); U.S. Accepts Creation of

GATT Panel to Study Sanctions on Brazilian PharmaceuticalGoods, [Jan.-June] Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 238 (Feb. 22, 1989).
27. GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIII, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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The United States nevertheless can make a fairly compelling case that
article XXIII was crafted specifically to take into account the predicament in which the United States finds itself.2" When GATT was negotiated, less than ten percent of United States exports were in any way tied
to intellectual property.2 Since that time, the importance of products
that embody intellectual property rights has increased dramatically: intellectual property-based industries have been among the fastest growing
sectors of the United States economy.30 While the United States may
well have negotiated GATT concessions on these products over the
years, it did so on the expectation that the value of those concessions
would not be undermined by something that substantially undercuts and
even eliminates the value of the original concessions.
A simple example may help to illustrate this point. Assume that in
early rounds of trade negotiations, the United States reduced its tariff on
shoes. In return, the United States received concessions from Brazil on
sound recordings. The United States felt this was a good trade-off because Brazil was a large market for music. If it turns out that the United
States can only export one record, which is then copied and distributed
throughout Brazil by local record and tape companies who pay nothing
to the United States copyright holder, clearly the value of that concession
has been seriously impaired in a way that was not within the reasonable
expectations of the United States.
The same principle can be extended to software, computers, chemicals,
and pharmaceutical products, although the facts and circumstances surrounding any particular concession would need to be considered. This
argument causes problems in the context of a particular case because it is
difficult to contain, and GATT precedents suggest that GATT panels
are very reluctant to embrace such broad, almost constitutional, arguments. The issue is further complicated by the fact that Brazil may not
have been party to the original negotiation in which the United States
lowered its shoe tariff. It may have been a "free rider" or simply come
along later with a competitive shoe industry able to take advantage of a
concession negotiated and paid for by others.
The difficulty of persuading a GATT panel to accept this analysis
does not detract from the possibility that, as a matter of fundamental
political and economic dynamics, the analysis is correct. The United

28. See R. HUDEC, supra note 4, at 46-48 (discussing article XXIII and the nonviolation nullification or impairment doctrine).
29. GLOBAL CONSENSUS, supra note 3, at 4, chart 1.1.
30. By 1986, over 27% of United States exports contained an intellectual property
component. Id.
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States economy has moved steadily into areas where the value of its
products is tied to intellectual and artistic creativity. If these assets are as
vulnerable to plunder as the slow-moving merchant ships of the 1700s
were to the Barbary pirates, the United States ability to trade with countries that harbor such pirates could be seriously hampered. Harm to
United States interests is exacerbated when the pirates can turn around
and exploit their bounty by reproducing it for sale in domestic and foreign markets as though it were their own, thereby further damaging the
export potential of United States industry.
The point is that what may not be compelling in the context of a
GATT panel proceeding may well be more compelling in the give-andtake environment of negotiations, in which the specifics of any particular
trade-off can be obscured in the context of an overall package and every
negotiator can-and most certainly will-return to her country and
claim that she got more than she gave. Here again, however, there is
ample room for pessimism: not only are countries unwilling to accede to
a higher standard of protection for intellectual property rights in the
context of a new code, but they are also using GATT rules to challenge
procedures employed by the United States to protect its rights holders
from imports of infringing products. Indeed, according to a recent
GATT ruling on section 337, a number of aspects of the United States
procedures to address infringement by imported products violate GATT
rules regarding national treatment." If this finding is upheld by the
GATT Council-and tradition indicates that it will be, despite United
States objection-it will undercut the existing regime for protecting intellectual property in the United States, and might also jeopardize the effort to negotiate enhanced protection in the new GATT Round.
Thus, we come to the final predicament for United States policymakers: persuading our trading partners that we are serious about our priorities and that more fundamental changes in the United States posture

31.

A GATT panel, convened at the request of the European Community, found

that a number of the procedures embodied in section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19

U.S.C. 1202 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (codified as amended 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987)) discriminate against foreign companies by denying them the rights avail-

able to domestic defendants. Under section 337, the United States International Trade
Commission (ITC) can adjudicate claims of foreign patent infringements, an activity

which is carried out only by federal courts in cases involving domestic products. The
panel found that section 337 gave United States industry plaintiffs the ability to choose
in which forum to attack foreign products. These same plaintiffs had no such choice in
cases involving domestic products. The report also identified other ITC procedures under
section 337 which it found discriminated against foreign defendants. U.S. Agonizes Over
Patent Rules, Fin. Times (London), Feb. 7, 1989, at 20, col. 1.
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in the GATT and elsewhere will occur if progress cannot be made on
this issue. This is perhaps the real Achilles Heel of the United States
because our constitutional structure-indeed, our very historical and cultural heritage-makes it extraordinarily difficult for us to unite behind a
common vision or set of priorities. As United States officials are fond of
pointing out, we have no single industrial policy. In fact, we have hundreds of policies, all pursued by individuals and groups who believe that
they have a better way to compete. When translated at the governmental
level, this kind of atomized approach means that every agency feels free
to pursue its own agenda unrestrained by any sense of priority or even a
need to coordinate in pursuit of common objectives.
Fortunately, this extremist view is not truly accurate. Rather, the extent to which a common sense of priorities seems to be permeating the
various agencies is striking. Driving this need to unite behind some common objectives is the sense of crisis over the decline in United States
competitiveness and the seriousness of our trade and budget deficits. To
test this hypothesis, one may assess the issue of the merger of trade and
intellectual property from a different perspective, namely, that of the
traditional intellectual property arena. To do this, we will focus on semiconductor mask works bejause this case affords an opportunity to see the
results when a new form of intellectual property right is created in the
middle of the international debate over the need to provide better protection. The United States semiconductor example allows us to consider, if
we could start from scratch, what we would do to ensure protection in
other countries. Would the United States take a different approach to the
negotiation of international protection? Finally, what messages are we
sending to other countries by the way we are handling this international
issue?
III.

THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PARADIGM

It would be a mistake to trace the source of the policy shift regarding
trade and intellectual property to any single event or decision. It is helpful to consider, however, the events of 1983-84 that helped mobilize political support for enhanced protection of intellectual property as an essential element in enhancing United States competitiveness in high
technology. In a 1983 address to the nation, President Reagan pledged to
maintain America's technological superiority into the next century. In its
response, the Democratic Party focused on the need to promote competitiveness through a more concentrated focus on research and development.
Indeed, the country had not seen an equivalent challenge since President
Kennedy launched the United States space program in response to the
Soviet Sputnik rocket.
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The irony of this scenario is that neither party had a very clear picture of what measures should be pursued. When asked for its program,
the White House admitted that.the President's pledge was a last minute
addition without backup papers. This vacuum did not survive for long,
however; the private sector emerged with a series of initiatives intended
to capture the renewed political attention to United States technological
leadership. In virtually every program advanced, both trade and intellectual property issues featured prominently.
The other irony is that this resurgent interest in high technology and
competitiveness followed an intense debate during the late 1970s and
early 1980s over the merits of industrial policy and, more specifically,
the use of trade measures as an instrument of such policy. Largely conducted in the editorial pages, the debate added little to public understanding of the issues because it tended to be limited to rhetorical posturing over the merits of free trade versus protectionism, without much
focus on the merits of the proposals being advanced. According to this
rhetoric, if Congress were allowed to legislate trade measures, it would
repeat the debacle of the Smoot-Hawley tariff legislation of 1930.2 In
retrospect, it took Congress ten years to demonstrate-in the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988-that it could indeed legislate
measures to promote international competitiveness without indulging itself in excess.
The crucial difference between what occurred in 1983-84 and the earlier period is that the latter debate was driven largely by the private
sector. Industries that previously were strangers to the Washington scene
began to emerge and organize themselves in pursuit of public policies
that were more responsive to the competitive challenges that they faced.
In early 1983, the United States Semiconductor Industry Association advanced a six-point legislative platform constructed on the premise that
the United States needed a series of interrelated policy measures. Important among these was the need to protect the intellectual property rights
of semiconductor producers, particularly as they relate to the ever more
complicated designs of semiconductor masks. The United States could
accomplish this objective only by extending intellectual property laws to
cover semiconductor designs.
For several years, the United States has been working with some
thirty-five other countries in a series of negotiations to fashion a treaty

32. Act of June 17, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, repealed 1948. For a
discussion of the consequences of the Smoot-Hawley legislation (which raised duties to
the highest level in United States history and was followed by similar trade restrictions
by other countries), see R. HUDEC, supra note 4, at Chapter 1.
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for the protection of semiconductor chip designs. At issue is the intellectual property embodied in the design of circuits that allow semiconductors to perform their various functions, from storing memory to managing complex computational tasks. For the semitonductor industry, the
treaty would codify an emerging international consensus that the innovation and research that culminates in the creation of new designs is worthy of legal protection. But the outcome of these negotiations could well
have implications beyond semiconductors, considering that the United
States is currently seeking to engage the international community in bilateral and multilateral efforts to provide better protection of intellectual
property rights in all of their various forms.
The stage for these negotiations was set by the enactment in the
United States of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984
(SCPA),33 followed in 1985 by the enactment of a similar law in Japan.3 The inclusion in United States law of reciprocity provisions that
grant protection in the United States only to nationals of foreign countries that provide comparable protection to United States nationals under
their own laws especially caught the attention of other countries with
indigenous semiconductor industries.3 5 Eighteen countries3 6 have applied
for and received reciprocal protection for their nationals in the United
States based on a showing that they were taking reasonable steps toward

33. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter SPCA.
34. Act Concerning the Circuit Layout of a Semiconductor Integrated Circuit, Law.
No. 43 of 1985, (July 1985) (Japan) (Ministry of International Trade and Industry).
35. 17 U.S.C. §§ 902(a)(2), 914 (Supp. V 1987). Section 914 permits the issuance of
interim orders by which nationals of foreign countries can register their designs in the
United States if (a) their home country is making good faith efforts and reasonable progress toward enacting legislation or entering into a treaty which would provide protection
to United States mask works; (b) the nationals of that country are not engaged in the
copying of mask works; and (c) the purposes of the statute and international comity
would be furthered by issuance of the order. Section 902(a)(2) provides for permanent
protection for foreign mask works through the issuance of a Presidential Proclamation,
based on a finding that the foreign nation extends to United States mask works protection on substantially the same basis as either the protection extended to domestic mask
works, or the protection provided by the United States law. A foreign national can also
qualify for reciprocal treatment under the SCPA by signing a treaty providing mask
work protection to which the United States is a party. Id. § 902(a)(1)(a)(ii). To date, no
such treaty exists.
36. Interim protection under section 914 of the SCPA has been granted to Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Austria has also recently applied to receive such
protection.
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the enactment of protection for semiconductor designs.
The "reciprocity" provisions of the SCPA warrant special attention
because the SOPA's two-part approach actually combines both the traditional policy of the Copyright Law (in section 902) with a stricter form
of reciprocity closer to the trade arena (in section 914)." Under section
902(a)(2), a provision modelled after the "national treatment" concept of
the Copyright Act, 8 permanent reciprocity is available to nationals of a
foreign country that provide nationals protection for United States nationals on "substantially the same basis as that ... to mask works of its
own nationals . . . or . . . on substantially the same basis as" the
SCPA" This language is interesting because, read literally, it would
allow a foreign country to claim permanent reciprocity on the basis that
it provides no protection either to its own nationals or to United States
nationals."' Procedurally, the decision whether to issue a Presidential
proclamation under section 902 only recently has been governed by any
safeguards of hearings or public comment, a practice that also paralleled
the ex parte nature of equivalent proceedings under the Copyright Act. 4'
By contrast, section 914 (which has no precedent in United States
law) is both procedurally and substantively stronger than section
902(a)(2) in its reciprocity orientation. Although the ultimate standard
for protection is the same as that under section 902(a)(2) (national treatment or protection substantially equivalent to that provided in the
SCPA), additional trade-related requirements must also be met to obtain
a section 914 order: (1) nationals of the foreign country must not be
engaged in piracy of mask works; and (2) the purposes of the statute
must be furthered.4 2 Clearly, a country's failure to provide protection to
both home country and foreign nationals would not further the purposes
of the statute. The procedures employed in section 914 proceedings also

37. For a detailed comparison of sections 902 and 914, see Stern, The Semiconductor
Chip ProtectionAct of 1984: The InternationalComity of IndustrialProperty Rights, 3
INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 273-310 (1986).

38.
39.

See 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(4) (1982).
17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987).

40. See Stern, supra note 37, at 292-95. Stern points out that such an interpretation
would be totally inconsistent with the legislative history and while the Japanese industry
and the Canadian Government have advanced such an interpretation, the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) has not adopted such an interpretation.
41. See id. at 299-300. The absence of regulations governing the issuance of a Presidential Proclamation became an issue in the 1987 legislative extension of the authority to
issue interim protection under section 914. The PTO has now issued regulations that
allow for public comment and a public hearing.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 914 (Supp. V 1987).

238

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:223

ensure sufficient transparency and participation by United States industry to ensure that the purpose of the SCPA is unlikely to be thwarted by
a literal reading of the statute to require only "national treatment,"
however poor.
One interesting issue that has arisen recently under the SCPA highlights the merger of intellectual property and trade issues and the dilemma faced by the United States in reconciling its policies in these two
areas. The Patent and Trademark Office is currently evaluating whether
Presidential proclamations extending permanent protection to mask
works of Japan and Sweden should be issued. Both the American Electronics Association (AEA) and the United States Semiconductor Industry
Association (SIA) have opposed the issuance of such a proclamation with
respect to Japan. AEA's opposition is based on a "pure" intellectual
property argument: Japan in fact fails to proide adequate protection not
only for semiconductors, but also for other products. SIA's argument,
however, squarely confronts the question of the extent to which trade
and intellectual property rights should be linked in formulating United
States policy. SIA contends that the United States derives little valuefrom any intellectual property protection Japan grants because Japan.
fails to provide access to its market for United States semiconductors.
The United States Government's acceptance or rejection of this argument
should provide some interesting insights into United States willingness to
take an official position in support of the linkage of trade and intellectual
property issues outside of areas in which such linkages have been legislatively mandated, for example, under section 301.
Given the level of success that the SCPA already has achieved in stimulating the enactment of chip protection laws abroad, the question arises
as to why the United States should seek a treaty? A good case can be
made that the reciprocity provisions in United States law have provided
a sufficient incentive for other countries to enact their own laws. More-over, the procedures under United States law allow for a careful review
of the actual legislation and regulations of other countries before reciprocity is granted. By contrast, most intellectual property treaties do not
provide an effective means to look behind a country's signature on the
treaty document to assess how scrupulously it is carrying out its obligations. This, of course, is one of the United States major concerns in the
new GATT Round and explains its insistence on better consultation and
dispute settlement procedures to be applicable generally to intellectual
property rights.
The best case for a treaty must be based upon the need to carry the
message beyond the countries that already share the United States position with regard to the importance of protecting the intellectual invest-
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ment in semiconductor designs; in most cases, this means developing
countries like South Korea, Brazil, India, Taiwan, Singapore, and
China. While only one of these countries (South Korea) has a worldclass semiconductor industry, the others certainly have the potential to
develop one over the next ten years as their markets for semiconductors
and products incorporating semiconductors develop. Therefore, it is important that they recognize the relationship between the protection of
intellectual property rights and the development of their own industries.
For this reason, the United States has actively supported the interest
of WIPO in developing a treaty. And WIPO has been impressively agile
in taking up the task and moving the process forward. In a little over
two years, the WIPO Secretariat has brought together experts from all
over the world and prepared a draft treaty that is ready to be presented
to a diplomatic conference. The United States offer to host such a conference was accepted in September 1988 by the WIPO Governing Council,
and the conference was scheduled to be held in May 1989 in
Washington.
The draft treaty as it now stands embodies a set of minimum standards that track the provisions of United States law fairly closely. The
coverage of the treaty (provided that discrete semiconductors are included) is consistent with coverage under United States law, as are the
provisions for exclusive rights, exceptions for innocent infringement and
reverse engineering, and the duration of protection. The treaty would
allow a country to protect mask works under either its copyright law or
a sui generis law like those enacted in the United States and Japan.
The real problem with the treaty is that it really does not go far
enough; in this respect it runs the risk of falling into the same rut in
which a number of other intellectual property rights treaties currently
find themselves. Regrettably absent from the treaty are any provisions
governing the private enforcement of rights, including the availability of
injunctions, damages, and other remedial measures. Although this absence is typical of WIPO treaties, it nevertheless leaves a vacuum in an
area critical to the practical side of ensuring protection. Equally important from a practical standpoint is the fact that the treaty does not provide a mechanism for mutual recognition of registrations, where registration is required.
The biggest threat posed by the treaty is that it would allow a signatory country to provide a level of protection that is totally inadequate but
arguably consistent with the treaty. The problem is twofold. First, the
language of the treaty is unavoidably general, leaving much to the interpretation of national law. Unfortunately, some countries are simply hostile to the protection of mask work rights, as they are to the protection of
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other forms of intellectual property rights. These countries are arguing
for the inclusion of provisions that would allow compulsory licensing or
special exceptions for developing countries that effectively would eliminate protection. One would have to include many of the developing countries that we are trying to draw into the system of protection required by
the treaty in this camp.
An example will illustrate this problem. A provision has been added
that explicitly allows countries to enforce any law dealing with the abuse
of monopoly power. If one draws the inference that the mere granting of
mask work protection accords monopoly, as implied by the inclusion of
such language, one can easily make the case for compulsory licensing
provisions administered by the government office overseeing such rights.
In the context of the chip treaty, this concession is all the more painful
because the treaty already inclides provisions that strike a particularly
careful balance between the rights of the creator and the interests of the
public. For one, protection is limited to ten years. Even more important,
the treaty protects the rights of reverse engineers and innocent infringers.
Given the competitiveness of the world-wide semiconductor market and
the limitations on exclusive rights inherent in these exceptions, it is difficult to see what monopoly power flows from the granting of exclusive
rights in semiconductor designs. In short, there is simply no basis for
allowing, explicitly or implicitly, exceptions for compulsory licensing.
Compounding the problem is a lack of treaty measures to protect
against abuses of this provision. Although the current draft of the treaty
contains provisions for consultation and dispute settlement, they have not
yet been accepted. Moreover, WIPO is now considering adopting an independent treaty on dispute settlement that would govern all of the other
treaties administered by WIPO-and which contains no enforcement
mechanisms. If a WIPO semiconductor treaty continues the WIPO tradition of lack of dispute settlement procedures, each country can essentially interpret the treaty for itself. If experience with other treaties is
any example, this means that even if one starts with a fairly good set of
standards, there is a real risk that the protection accorded United States
rights in other countries will be eroded over time.
In the face of such a prospect, what option does the United States
have? First, it could grin and bear it, trying to shore up compliance
through diplomatic initiatives. Or, in the extreme, the United States
Government could take the offender to the International Court of Justice. Finally, the United States could withdraw from the treaty. In today's world, none of these is a particularly desirable or realistic option.
The logical conclusion that seems to emerge from this analysis is that
there is no viable alternative to a United States position that makes clear
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both internally and to our negotiating partners that a treaty is in the
United States interest only within certain parameters. International organizations like WIPO have the advantage of drawing together many of
the countries we would seek to influence to adopt better protection of
intellectual property rights, but not without some risk. The risk is that
in the pursuit of an international consensus, we may embrace a set of
standards that-in principle or in practice-are not worth having.
Equally important is a workable enforcement mechanism that would
form an integral part of the treaty. Such a mechanism should be
designed to prevent the erosion of protection over time and should be
capable of looking beyond a country's signature on a treaty document
into the signatory's national law and practice.
The implications of these developments for United States efforts in the
GATT are obvious. The positions the United States has taken in WIPO
and will take at the diplomatic conference on semiconductor designs will
be an important signal to our negotiating partners in GATT. If the
United States repeats the mistakes of the past in negotiating a treaty that
compromises basic standards of protection and fails to include adequate
provisions for enforcement and dispute settlement, it will be announcing
to the world that nothing fundamental has changed in United States policy toward intellectual property rights. A semiconductor treaty could
well look good in the context of other WIPO treaties, but still fall far
short of the ambitious objectives of the United States Government in the
new GATT Round.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This review of United States policy initiatives reveals that the relationship of intellectual property rights and international trade is more
like a two career-marriage than a merger. At the international level, the
two domains will remain separate but will inevitably have a much
greater degree of mutual interaction than was previously the case. By
contrast, at the level of United States policy, there is very likely to be a
much closer coordination as the United States moves toward a sharper
focus on coordinated measures to improve the competitiveness of the
United States economy.
There are a number of obstacles that United States policyholders will
encounter in achieving such coordination, however. Chief among these is
the division of authority within the United States Government on both
intellectual property rights and trade issues-let alone areas where these
two domains intersect-that makes it difficult to identify a clear focus of
responsibility for ensuring world-wide protection of intellectual property
rights. Semiconductors provide a dramatic illustration of this difficulty. A
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number of agencies are involved in chip protection issues: the Copyright
Office has headed the United States delegation to the WIPO working
groups; the State Department will host the WIPO conference in May;
and the Patent and Trademark Office has overseen the administration of
the reciprocity provisions of the SCPA. The Office of the USTR, meanwhile, handles GATT negotiations on intellectual property but has not
been involved in any of these other chip protection issues. United States
industry has spent considerable time in section 914 proceedings educating the Patent and Trademark Office on the issues and problems related
to semiconductor chip protection, only to find different agencies handling
these issues in the international arena. Clearly, better coordination of
policy efforts is needed.
In sum, the following conclusions seem to flow from the preceding
discussion:
(1) What the United States does in WIPO, half a mile down the road
from GATT and involving many of the same countries, will have
profound implications for what we will be able to achieve in GATT
with regard to minimum standards, enforcement, and other critical issues. As of yet, too little thought or planning has been devoted to ensuring that United States strategy takes into account the interactions between the SCPA, WIPO, and GATT.
(2) The lack of a clear, focused United States strategy predicated on
the use of all of the policy tools available to advance the interests of
United States firms in obtaining global protection is a serious hindrance
to the achievement of United States objectives in this critical area.
(3) And the SCPA in particular, with its emphasis on reciprocity, provides a useful model for efforts to protect new forms of technology.

